Operationalizing of DCV Microfoundations: A Behavioral Model for a Transforming System Integrator Firm

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Abstract: The company in question, as one of the market leaders, aims to maintain competitiveness and increase the share of its own high-margin IT products and complex IT projects to 80% of revenue within three years, doubling the gross margin. Based on Teece's sensing–seizing–reconfiguring model, this study analyzes which individual and team factors activate the company's dynamic capabilities at different stages and support its strategic flexibility. A mixed method was used: (1) a Likert scale survey (n=86; 35 statements) covered seven constructs: systems, creative and visionary thinking; strategic consensus at the team level; attitudes toward change, technology and mistakes; and orientation toward "execution as learning"; (2) Nine semi-structured interviews with team leaders and HR business partners supplemented the quantitative data. The Mann–Whitney U test revealed statistically significant differences in the level of dynamic capabilities between the innovation-oriented units (Transformation Office, Corporate University, Creative Class) and the routine-oriented IT systems support team ($p < 0.05$). Qualitative analysis showed that the key, but unevenly developed drivers of change are psychological safety and the maturity of knowledge sharing processes within and between teams. The central contribution of the study was the empirical confirmation of the two-factor model of team microfoundations, reflecting the behavioral drivers of dynamic capabilities: (1) Team Strategy Foresight (TSF) - cognitive alignment, collective strategic vision, and scenario thinking; (2) Learn Failure (LF) - a culture of meaningful attitude to errors and reflective learning. Both factors demonstrated high internal consistency, moderate interrelationships, and distinct roles across phases of the DCV cycle. Together, they explain key differences in team adaptability and provide an operationalization of the theoretical model. The paper also provides practical recommendations tailored to each team's profile. In summary, the study demonstrates how the development of TSF and LF transforms the abstract concept of dynamic capabilities into a practical model that ensures strategic adaptability in the face of macroeconomic turbulence and increasing competition in the IT sector.

Keywords: Dynamic capabilities, Microfoundations, Strategic thinking, Execution-as-learning, IT-Services transformation

1. Introduction

The concept of dynamic capabilities (Dynamic Capabilities View, DCV) is already recognized as one of the key paradigms of strategic management, which explains the ways of companies adapting to changes in the external environment and maintaining competitive advantages in conditions of high uncertainty. In highly dynamic industries (e.g. high technology, Internet services, software, etc.), long-term success is determined not so much by a one-time purchase of "rare" resources, but by the company's ability to flexibly restructure and effectively coordinate internal and external competencies (Teece, 2007; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997). However, the number of attempts to operationalize the theoretical model of the sensing, seizing, and reconfiguring processes remains small (a rare example of exceptions is, for example, Kump et al., 2019). Toward a dynamic capabilities scale: measuring organizational sensing, seizing, and transforming capacities. Industrial and Corporate Change, 28(5), 1149-1172.).

Microfoundation studies (Felin et al., 2012) provide an opportunity to focus on individual and team practices that shape high-level capabilities. However, most empirical work is aimed at studying either narrow competencies or qualitative case approaches.

This study aims to operationalize the foundation of DCV and is based on a mixed methodology. The practice of one of the leaders in system integration in Europe is taken on a basis. Technological market trends force system integrators to radically change their business model from the traditional resale of equipment and licenses to bringing their own high-tech solutions to the market and implementing innovative integrated solutions based on flexible contracts. Thus, the share of the company's service revenue increased from 45% (2021) to 56% (2024) and should reach 80% by 2027. Such dynamics are possible only with the development of behavioral patterns that accelerate the market signals sensing and internal resources reconfiguring. Recent field evidence shows, however, that tightly knit informal networks ("blat") can actively block those very patterns, derailing digital-transformation projects even in otherwise favourable strategic contexts (Aksiutin et al., 2022). The purpose of this study is to identify which patterns are critical for the development of DCV processes and how they are grouped. First, we validate a tool that reduces seven theoretical clusters to an

empirically stable two-factor model. Second, we compare these bundles with the types of teams within the company and offer a practical roadmap of recommendations. Thus, the work contributes to both the DCV methodology and the management practice of transforming a company using DCV.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Dynamic Capabilities and Their Microfoundations

The DCV was developed in response to the inadequacy of the Resource-Based View (RBV), which could not fully explain the sustainable competitive advantage of organizations in the face of uncertainty and rapid change in the external environment (Teece, 2007). According to the DCV, a company's ability to adapt to change depends on three main processes: sensing (identifying opportunities and threats), seizing (mobilizing resources to realize opportunities), and reconfiguring (restructuring and transforming internal processes and resources) (Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Strong dynamic capabilities facilitate the development of innovative products and entry into new markets, providing a company with a sustainable competitive advantage. Unlike static capabilities, they rely not only on efficiency, but also on learning, flexibility, and entrepreneurial activity. As a result, a company must consciously and continuously identify, develop, and protect key internal competencies. To solve this problem, it is important not to make a one-time strategic decision, but rather an ongoing management process that includes assessing external and internal changes, flexibly adjusting the internal structure with an understanding of all the interrelations of the elements and maintaining the ability to experiment and learn quickly. One recent mixed-methods study of a consulting firm in strategic transition mapped three distinct employee clusters – “Active Supporters,” “Cautious Appraisers,” and “Conservative Skeptics” – and demonstrated how differentiated, change-oriented leadership interventions convert micro-level readiness into macro-level capability activation (Diakova et al., 2024). However, despite the theoretical popularity and prevalence of DCV, researchers note the excessive abstractness of this concept and difficulties with its operationalization (Arndt, F., Galvin, P., Jansen, R. J. G., Lucas, G. J. M., & Su, P., 2022; Wilden, R., Devinney, T. M., & Dowling, G. R., 2016). To overcome these shortcomings, a tendency has formed in scientific literature to study the so-called microfoundations - basic behavioral and cognitive elements that underline the formation of dynamic capabilities (Felin et al., 2012; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015).

2.2 Micro-Fundamental Categories

In this study, we draw on a wide body of literature (Edmondson, 1999; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Pisano, 2019; Teece, 2007; Thomke, 2020) to identify the following microfundamental categories: strategic thinking at the individual and team level, attitude to mistakes (smart failures), new technologies and changes, as well as the application of the execution-as-learning concept in practice.

Even though these categories are most often analyzed separately in the literature, we consider it important to study them in their interrelation as complex behavioral bundles. Such an integrative approach is consistent with the position of Helfat and Martin (2015), who emphasize that microfundaments are more effective in combination, interacting and strengthening each other's influence on the ability of organizations to successfully adapt to changes in the external environment.

There are different views on the components of strategic thinking in the scientific community, however, in this paper we rely on the approach of I. Bonn (2001), according to which strategic thinking should be considered as a complex and multi-level management competence, including both cognitive and behavioral elements. Based on this framework, we focus on a number of key components that are critical for the formation of strategic thinking in conditions of high uncertainty. Systems thinking is defined as the ability to perceive the organization and its environment holistically, to take into account the interrelations and consequences of decisions at different levels (Goldman et al., 2015). Creativity and innovative thinking are associated with the generation and application of new ideas, approaches and solutions, which is a key factor in the implementation of adaptive strategies in conditions of uncertainty (Anderson, N., Potočnik, K., & Zhou, J., 2014; Basadur, M., Gelade, G., & Basadur, T., 2014). Visionary thinking is the next element of strategic thinking, which allows you to form long-term goals and adapt to constant changes in the external and internal environment. Visionary thinking is considered by us as the ability to anticipate the future and bring it into the present (Nuntamanop, P., Kauranen, I., & Igel, B., 2013).

The organizational level of strategic thinking consolidates the sum of individual abilities, which also ensures a high synergistic effect arising from the combination of diverse ideas and the depth of interdisciplinary knowledge (Bonn, I., 2001). We consider the attitude to new technologies as technological foresight, which is

the process of forecasting and assessing future technological trends and development scenarios, allowing organizations to proactively respond to changes (Bagrationi & Gordienko, 2024) and use emerging opportunities before competitors (Rohrbeck & Gemünden, 2011). Thus, technological foresight is not merely a scanning routine but an institutionalized capability, especially in fast-moving tech domains (Gordienko & Bagrationi, 2024)

One of the approaches within the framework of the integration of the knowledge system and dynamic capabilities of companies is associated with the formation of capabilities of the knowledge management process, which reflect the ability of the organization to identify, analyze and control the necessary and available knowledge for their further expansion and achievement of strategic goals (Kaur, V., Mehta, S., 2018), whereas deliberately designed learning architectures institutionalize that knowledge-management spine (Zinchenko et al., 2024). According to other authors, the evolution of the company's dynamic capabilities is based on a combination of relatively passive processes of experience accumulation and targeted processes of analysis, articulation and codification of knowledge, allowing the organization to actively develop and adapt its operational practices (Winter, S., 2003)

Acceleration of the development of dynamic capabilities is associated with how the organization learns from each project, how it records and disseminates best practices, that is, the influence of the development of learning capabilities is emphasized. At the same time, training is of a collective nature (routine practices, organizational interaction), and its results are consolidated in organizational processes. Within the framework of the concept of "performance as training", employees undergo constantly repeating training cycles as part of their daily activities. Thus, the attitude towards errors and the concept of execution-as-learning emphasizes the importance of perceiving errors and failures as a valuable source of knowledge and experience for further improvement and adaptation of organizational processes (Sitkin, S.B. 1992; Edmondson & Lei, 2014).

2.3 Limitations of Current Theoretical and Empirical Models

Despite the existence of individual studies on the above-mentioned microfoundations, there are still a number of significant unexplored aspects in scientific literature.

First, there are no comprehensive validated scales and models that integrate various microfoundational constructs into a single measurement structure, especially regarding dynamic capabilities in rapidly changing technological environments.

Second, most studies were conducted on samples of Western companies, while literature lacks data on the microfoundations of dynamic capabilities in post-socialist countries that require special adaptive strategies. Our context aligns with prior evidence that digital transformation trajectories are strongly shaped by existing social-capital configurations; informal networks can both enable and derail change by rerouting attention and resources (Bagrationi et al., 2021; 2022).

This study aims to overcome these limitations by integrating quantitative and qualitative approaches to construct and validate a comprehensive model of the microfoundations of dynamic capabilities using the example of a large system integrator in Eastern Europe

3. Methodology

3.1 Design and Sample

The methodological approach used was a mixed research design, combining (1) a quantitative survey — 35 statements grouped into 7 clusters, and (2) qualitative semi-structured interviews with team leaders and HR managers, the purpose of which was to clarify the quantitative results and obtain information about the specifics of internal processes, inter-team interaction, and organizational culture. This approach allowed, on the one hand, to quantitatively confirm the factor structure of the microfoundations, and on the other, to qualitatively describe their practical manifestation in teams. The mixed approach ensured both the breadth of coverage and the depth of analysis. The study included four teams: (1) Corporate University, responsible for developing leadership and professional competencies, forming a learning culture; (2) Transformation Office, coordinating transformation initiatives and strategic change planning; (3) Creative Class — a group of the company's "talents" based on the monitoring results, implementing the most innovative digital products and services of the company; (4) IT-Support Team, responsible for production activities and current support of infrastructure with less pronounced innovative activity. The respondents were selected purposefully (according to the criterion of functional relevance) - mainly from teams actively involved in transformation initiatives (corporate university, Transformation Office, creative class), one team with predominantly

supporting, standardized processes (IT-Support Team) were also selected to test the hypothesis about statistically significant differences in the manifestation of behavioral microfoundations between innovation units and the operational group.

3.2 Research Tools

Our goal was to empirically validate a construct that simultaneously considers elements of strategic thinking, readiness for change, and execution-as-learning practices. This required the development of an original questionnaire with a focus on an interdisciplinary set of behavioral indicators reflecting team microfoundations of dynamic capabilities. Ready-made methods did not allow us to specify these aspects.

For the quantitative stage, a questionnaire was developed consisting of 35 statements based on seven theoretically substantiated clusters proposed by the authors: (1) systems thinking; (2) creativity and intuitive thinking; (3) team strategic thinking; (4) technological awareness and digital competencies; (5) readiness for change, foresight, and uncertainty management; (6) continuous learning and the concept of execution-as-learning; (7) attitude towards mistakes and psychological safety. Respondents rated the degree of agreement with each statement on a 7-point Likert scale (from “completely disagree” to “completely agree”).

3.3 Quantitative Analysis

To test and confirm the presence of statistically significant differences between independent groups (teams of the corporate university, Transformation Office, creative class group and team-corporate systems), we used the Mann-Whitney U-test. To test the significance, the obtained U values were compared with the critical value from the table of critical values of the Mann-Whitney U-test for a given significance level (α) and sample sizes ($n_1 = n_2 = 7$). For $\alpha = 0.05$ and $n_1 = n_2 = 7$, the critical value of U (cr) = 8. The results of the study allowed us to identify statistically significant differences between two types of teams - those focused primarily on innovative processes (Corporate University, Transformation Office, creative class) and a team with predominantly routine processes (corporate IT systems support team). Next, a factor analysis (EFA) was conducted using the principal component method with Promax rotation, which allowed us to identify latent factors. As a result, items with loadings below 0.55 or with cross-loadings above 0.30 were removed. After cleaning the scale, 16 statements remained, grouped into two stable factors. Preliminary analysis of the polychoric correlation matrix showed excellent factorability of the sample: KMO = 0.90, Bartlett $\chi^2(210) = 683$, $p < 0.001$. This corresponds to the ‘marvelous’ level according to Kaiser’s classification (1974).

Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed using the Diagonally Weighted Least Squares (DWLS) method, which is optimal for ordinal data. The resulting model demonstrated an excellent level of fit to the data: $\chi^2(103) = 75.3$; CFI = 1.000; TLI = 1.008; RMSEA = 0.020; SRMR = 0.044.

A statistically significant positive relationship ($\rho = 0.77$; $p < 0.001$) was found between the two latent factors TSF and LF, which indicate their functional connectivity in real team practices. Despite the moderately high correlation, the confidence interval [0.656; 0.883] does not include the value 1, which indicates the presence of discriminant validity: the constructs are not redundant and reflect different aspects of DCV. Their combination is typical for highly adaptive teams and represents complementary microfoundations of the sensing, seizing and reconfiguring processes.

3.4 Qualitative Analysis

Qualitative data was collected through semi-structured interviews with team leaders and HR managers lasting between 40 and 60 minutes. The aim of this stage was to obtain information for interpreting quantitative data, as well as identifying specific team practices related to the formation and implementation of dynamic capabilities. The interview guide was developed taking into account the structure of the questionnaire and the conceptual framework of DCV and included (1) a discussion of the survey results (interpretation of the overall results, analysis of discrepancies, discussion of each cluster and their manifestations in team practice); (2) identification of DCV practices (identification of empirical manifestations of the sensing, seizing and reconfiguring processes in the daily activities of teams and (3) a discussion of organizational learning and culture (aspects of mentoring, knowledge dissemination, execution as learning, cross-functional interaction, etc.). The analysis of the interview results was carried out using content analysis. The interview transcripts were initially coded manually, after which the categories were clarified and structured in the MAXQDA software environment, which ensured transparency, consistency and reproducibility of the analytical procedure. The categories were formed inductively - based on repeating semantic units in the respondents' statements, with subsequent aggregation into generalized thematic blocks.

4. Results

4.1 Factor Structure

Factor analysis allowed us to identify two stable behavioral bundles (latent factors) that combine several initially proposed theoretical categories.

Factor 1. TSF: This bundle combines three interrelated microfoundations of team behavior: (1) Collective strategic vision (coordinated formation of long-term goals and the semantic “north star” of the project); (2) Scenario-analytical scanning of the external environment (group monitoring of market trends, regulatory changes, and client requests); (3) Readiness for organizational shifts (cognitive attitude toward rapid restructuring of roles and processes when new opportunities arise). Thus, TSF includes statements regarding collective vision, analysis of external trends, and rapid adaptation to change.

The factor serves as a behavioral microfoundation of the Sensing phase and initiates the early Seizing-1 subphase (Teece, 2007): collective strategic vision increases sensitivity to external “weak signals”, minimizes the delay between trend detection and the development of primary hypotheses, readiness for restructuring reduces time-to-pivot, The construct is related to the team foresight capability (Schoemaker, 2020) and strategic issue diagnosis (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008) models. Standardized factor loadings ranged from 0.556 to 0.749, which confirms the internal consistency and validity of this factor.

Factor 2. LF: The second factor describes the culture of open discussion of errors, psychological safety and learning from experience ("execution-as-learning"). It includes items reflecting support for experiments, the perception of errors as a resource for learning and continuous improvement based on them. The construct captures the quality of collective handling of errors and supports the "double loop" of organizational learning and integrates: (1) Psychological safety (no sanctions for voicing doubts or failures); (2) Execution-as-Learning (setting for fast cycles hypothesis → experiment → lesson, where even negative results are converted into reliable knowledge).

Learn Failure supports the Reconfiguring phase, ensuring the plasticity of the business architecture when changing the project portfolio, and helps in the implementation of late Seizing-2. The construct resonates with the error management climate (Van Dyck, 2005) and execution-as-learning (Edmondson, 2011) theories. The loadings on this factor ranged from 0.601 to 0.786, confirming the high homogeneity of the construct. Thus, the hypothesis about the package structure of microfoundations was confirmed, which created the basis for analyzing the differences between the types of teams and further development of recommendations.

Qualitative interviews were conducted not for the purpose of statistical comparison of teams, but to understand the features of the manifestation of the studied behavioral patterns and the formation of practical recommendations for the development of microfoundations. Analysis of the interview results revealed key topics and practices that are critical for the successful development of dynamic capabilities, among which the most pronounced were (1) a high level of competition in the company, which reduces the level of psychological safety (the ability of employees to freely discuss errors and problems without fear of punishment); (2) insufficient knowledge and experience sharing (structures and rituals that support learning within the team), among which the most pronounced were: (1) high level of competition in the company, reducing the level of psychological safety (the ability of employees to freely discuss mistakes and problems without fear of punishment) and (2) insufficient knowledge and experience sharing (structures and rituals that support learning within teams and between departments).

Table 1: Two empirical bundles (TSF and LF) support the four key sub-processes of the DCV

DCV Model Element	Process Features	Microfoundation (bundle)
Sensing (early sensing/ scanning)	- Systematic collection and analysis of market information, including weak signals and early signs of change. - Joint formation of a "map of the future": discussion of possible scenarios and external trends. - Generation of hypotheses about potential windows of opportunity to which the organization can respond.	TSF promotes active strategic sensitivity of the team: a high level of collective thinking, including a systemic and scenario approach, allows participants to more accurately interpret a complex external environment and promptly identify important opportunities.
Seizing-1 (early selection and trial)	- Making decisions on launching prototypes (MVP), testing business hypotheses with minimal investment. - Initial distribution of resources between competitive initiatives and formation of teams for new tasks.	TSF ensures strategic alignment of the team: having a common understanding of goals and priorities facilitates choosing among alternatives, minimizes disagreements and accelerates the transition from idea to action. Teams quickly determine what to test, how to do it and which indicators are considered significant.
Reconfiguring (resource transformation)	- Flexible adaptation of organizational processes and redistribution of roles in accordance with new strategic tasks. - Embedding acquired knowledge and experimental developments in everyday practices.	LF supports a culture of meaningful attitude to mistakes and continuous learning from experience. Discussing and systematizing failures allows the team to adapt its activities without fear and resistance, rebuild processes in a timely manner, avoid repeating mistakes and strengthen internal flexibility.
Seizing-2 (scaling and value extraction)	- Making decisions on expanding the scale of successfully tested solutions: additional investments, entering new markets, increasing the team and resources. - Integrating new business models into standard operating activities.	LF promotes sustainable scaling due to the team's ability to reflect on its own path and record key findings Helps to avoid repeating mistakes, disseminate best practices and thereby increase the effectiveness of the implementation and sales of new solutions.

Taken together, a high level of TSF facilitates the formation and launch of early strategic initiatives, increasing the likelihood of timely response to external signals and trends. At the same time, a developed LF culture ensures the integration of lessons learned into organizational processes, strengthening the ability to adapt and accelerating subsequent opportunity recognition cycles. Thus, the identified bundles are not only statistically reliable, but also theoretically sound micro-foundations that form a stable cycle of dynamic capabilities: "recognize an opportunity → initiate a project → adapt the structure and consolidate new knowledge". Based on the analysis of quantitative and qualitative data, we were able to identify the specifics of each of the teams and formulate bottlenecks in the context of developing dynamic capabilities of flexibility and transformation. To improve the level of bundles, we developed differentiated recommendations for each of the teams studied.

For the corporate IT systems support team, the measures are based on the theory of group awareness with an emphasis on predictive practices.

Table 2: Recommended Team-Level Interventions Informed by Diagnostics and Theory for Building Dynamic Capabilities

Team	Diagnostic assessments of bundles	Recommended interventions (team level)	The theoretical framework
Corporate University	TSF = 4,9; LF = 5,0	1. Transparent career tracks and a competency model 2. Working groups: trend monitoring + foresight 3. Quarterly AAR (After Action Review) with other HR teams	Team foresight (Schoemaker, 2020); Transactive memory (Sargis & Larson, 2002); Double-loop learning (Argyris, 1999)
Transformation Office	TSF = 6,0; LF = 5,0	1. Development of an interactive map of transformational flows, a dashboard with feedback loops 2. Design sprints/brainstorms in the initial phase of each project 3. Quarterly Moonshot sprints (mini accelerator 4. "Fuckup Nights" with top managers	Knowledge integration routines (Srivastava & Mahoney, 2010); Collective sense-making (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014)
Creative Class	TSF = 5,0; LF = 5,2	1.Quarterly foresight sessions + retrospective forecasting. 2. Monthly internal "Trend watch digest" 3. Internal technical demos + hackathons 4. Panel discussions with partners/competitors	Experimental culture (Thomke, 2020); Team psychological safety (Edmondson, 1999)
IT-Support	TSF = 3,2; LF = 3,1	The measures are based on the theory of collective mindfulness s with an emphasis on predictive practices: 1.Simulating incidents 2.Discussing weak signals 3.Creating a knowledge base based on real cases	Error management climate (Fischer et al., 2018); Collective mindfulness (Bagrationi, K. 2017)

5. Discussion and Conclusion

This study set out to operationalize the microfoundations of the Dynamic Capabilities View (DCV) in a transforming system-integrator and, in doing so, to clarify how concrete team behaviors differentially activate Teece's sensing–seizing–reconfiguring cycle. Our mixed-methods evidence supports a parsimonious, two-bundle structure – TSF and LF – that is both psychometrically robust and practically legible for managers. The EFA/CFA results show that sixteen items reliably load on two distinct yet complementary factors, thereby addressing long-standing concerns that DCV research relies on abstract labels that are difficult to diagnose or intervene upon in teams. By mapping TSF onto sensing and early seizing-1 and LF onto reconfiguring and late seizing-2, we translate capability talk into observable, coachable routines.

First, our findings offer construct clarity for DCV microfoundations. Rather than a diffuse list of attitudes and skills, we show that two behavioral bundles parsimoniously organize the variance in team-level capability activation. This bundle logic complements the DCV literature by specifying where in the cycle each bundle does its work, thereby sharpening causal stories about capability enactment under uncertainty.

Second, we add empirical texture to the execution-as-learning thesis. While prior work treats "learning from failure" as a desirable climate, our evidence positions LF as a late-cycle engine that stabilizes reconfiguration and amplifies value extraction from validated initiatives (seizing-2). In other words, LF does not merely reduce blame, it institutionalizes retrospectives, codification, and cross-team diffusion so that every prototype and

incident becomes a reusable asset. This clarifies why organizations with strong TSF but weak LF often show fast starts yet struggle to scale: without LF, sensing wins do not compound into architectural change.

Third, the Mann–Whitney comparisons between innovation-oriented units (Transformation Office, Corporate University, Creative Class) and a routine-oriented IT support team revealed significantly higher capability levels in the former, consistent with the bundle–cycle mapping. This discriminant evidence strengthens our claim that the two bundles are sensitive to task environments that demand sensing and reconfiguring (not merely to generic "good team" variance).

Forth, the bundles translate into a diagnose-target-intervene pathway. Teams with low TSF need structured foresight (trend-watch rituals, scenario clinics) and shared strategic maps to compress the lag from signal to first experiment. Teams with low LF need explicit error-management routines (incident simulations, "small-loss" experiments) and codification forums to ensure that experimental learning propagates beyond project silos. We tried to operationalize this logic and align it with the distinct role each unit plays in the portfolio.

We offer a concise, validated two-bundle microfoundations model that turns DCV from an abstract ideal into an actionable diagnostic for teams undergoing transformation. TSF equips teams to see together and start together – to detect weak signals, forge a common "north star," and move quickly into disciplined trials – while LF enables them to learn together and scale together – to normalize intelligent failures, codify lessons, and reconfigure processes for durable advantage. In short, building dynamic capabilities is less about exhorting agility and more about engineering two repeatable bundles of behavior that power each phase of sensing, seizing, and reconfiguring.

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AI declarations: AI: (ChatGPT o3) was used to enhance language quality

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