The Organization of Wrongdoing: The Strategic Role of Leadership

Sara Rocchi
Department of Sociology and Social Research, University of Milano-Bicocca, Milan, Italy

sara.rocchi@unimib.it

Abstract: Research on organizational wrongdoing has largely explained the persistence of illegal or unethical practices through processes of normalization, whereby wrongdoing gradually becomes accepted as routine and legitimate within organizations. While this perspective has generated important insights, it pays less attention to the role of leadership in sustaining wrongdoing when organizational members continue to recognize its illegal or unethical nature. Drawing on the literature on organizational silence, this article argues that wrongdoing may persist not only because it is normalized, but also because leaders actively suppress dissent. The article develops this argument through the analysis of two case studies: the Theranos fraud and the Australian high-performance swimming scandal. Drawing on data collected from multiple sources, the analysis identifies two complementary types of leadership strategies for creating and sustaining organizational silence. First, leaders directly discourage voice by exerting pressure on individuals either through intimidation, degradation and retaliation or rationalization. Second, they indirectly maintain silence by designing organizational structures and processes that fragment information, restrict communication, and weaken monitoring systems. By integrating insights from the literature on organizational wrongdoing and organizational silence, the article contributes to research on the persistence of wrongdoing by showing that its continuation depends not only on processes of normalization but also on leaders' strategic efforts to suppress voice, suggesting that organizational silence should be understood as a mechanism that is conceptually distinct from, yet complementary to, the normalization of wrongdoing.

Keywords: Wrongdoing, Misconduct, Organisational analysis, Employee silence, Leadership

1. Introduction

Organizational wrongdoing refers to violations of laws (criminal, civil, or administrative) or sectoral and professional codes of conduct that are committed by members of an organization for its benefit (Palmer, Smith–Crowe and Greenwood, 2016). According to one strand of the literature, wrongdoing is a relatively rare phenomenon attributable to individuals with deviant moral dispositions or psychological traits. However, when wrongdoing persists over time and involves multiple members of an organization, explanations based solely on individual predispositions appear insufficient, suggesting that there are organizational factors that play a crucial role in sustaining such behaviour. Following Palmer (2012), we conceptualize wrongdoing as a "normal" feature of organizational life that emerges from the interaction among members' actions, latent organizational vulnerabilities, and environmental conditions (Greve, Palmer and Pozner, 2010; Palmer, Smith–Crowe and Greenwood, 2016; Gabbioneta, Clemente and Greenwood, 2023).

According to the wrongdoing-as-normal phenomenon perspective, the persistence of wrongdoing in organizations is rooted in processes through which deviant practices become taken for granted (Ashforth and Anand, 2003; Fleming et al., 2022; Entwistle and Doering, 2024). Ashforth and Anand (2003), for example, identified three mechanisms through which corruption becomes normalized within organizations: institutionalization, rationalization, and socialization. Together, these mechanisms transform corrupt practices into routines, provide cognitive justifications for their continuation, and present them to new members as acceptable behaviour. More recently, Fleming et al. (2022) highlighted that the tolerance of wrongdoing can also be normalized, leading non-corrupt bystanders to regard corruption as acceptable.

According to this perspective, once initiated by top management, wrongdoing tends to become self-reinforcing and self-perpetuating within the organization, as even individuals who would ordinarily be considered morally upright come to engage routinely in deviant practices without experiencing any sense of ethical dissonance (Ashforth and Anand, 2003). This occurs because wrongdoing is normalized, meaning that individuals become so accustomed to deviant practices that they no longer perceive them as improper or unethical, even when such practices would clearly be recognized as wrongdoing by an external observer (Vaughan, 1996).

However, the processes through which wrongdoing becomes entrenched and persists within organizations may be more fragile and contested than this literature suggests. Research on whistleblowing has shown that the normalization of wrongdoing does not encompass all organizational members. Rather, some individuals remain aware of the illegal or unethical nature of certain practices and are willing to report them, either through internal channels (internal whistleblowing) or to regulatory and law enforcement authorities (external whistleblowing) (Culiberg and Mihelič, 2017). Nevertheless, data also show that, in Europe, 80% of those who are aware of corrupt practices are reluctant to report them because of fear of retaliation (European

Commission, 2025). This evidence suggests that the persistence of wrongdoing cannot be explained solely by processes of normalization because some organizational members continue to recognize the illegality or unethical nature of certain practices. The fact that many individuals nevertheless refrain from reporting wrongdoing because they fear retaliation points to an active role of top management in sustaining wrongdoing by creating and maintaining organizational silence. In this article, these leadership efforts are conceptualized as strategic behaviour, namely a coherent pattern of actions (Mintzberg, 1987).

While the literature on organizational wrongdoing has, with some exceptions (e.g. Rocchi, 2025), tended to overlook the strategic role of leadership in sustaining wrongdoing over time, the literature on organizational and employee silence has devoted considerable attention to how leaders shape workplace conditions to discourage voice (Morrison, 2023). Building on these insights, the article contributes to the literature on organizational wrongdoing, particularly research on its persistence, by identifying organizational silence as a mechanism through which leaders actively maintain wrongdoing. It argues that organizational silence is a mechanism conceptually distinct from, yet complementary to, normalization, with each contributing to the persistence of wrongdoing over time. The next section reviews the concept of employee silence and its antecedents. The article then analyses two case studies to explore the strategic role of leadership in promoting silence through managerial practices and the design of organizational structures and processes. The final section discusses the findings, outlines their theoretical implications, and concludes.

2. Silence in Organizations: Concept, Antecedents and the Role of Leadership

Silence in organizations refers to the "widespread withholding of information about potential problems or issues by employees" (Morrison and Milliken, 2000, p. 706). Many studies have associated silence with negative consequences for both employees and organizations, including burnout (Sherf, Parke and Isaakyan, 2021), lower job satisfaction and organizational commitment (Efthymiopoulos, Goula and Psychogios, 2024), reduced task performance and creativity (Ozer, Chen and Tang, 2024), and uncivil interpersonal behaviour (Weiss and Zacher, 2025). Why, then, do individuals remain silent rather than speak up?

One strand of research focuses primarily on individual-level explanations to account for employees' withholding of concerns, opinions, or information (employee silence). Morrison and Milliken (2000) and Milliken, Morrison and Hewlin (2003) identified several reasons why employees choose to remain silent, including: concerns about damaging interpersonal relationships (e.g. being viewed negatively by colleagues or supervisors and losing trust, respect, or social support); fear of retaliation (e.g. job loss and missed promotions); and perceptions of futility, based on the belief that top management is unresponsive and that raising concerns is unlikely to produce meaningful change.

Over time, this line of research has led to a multidimensional conceptualization of silence, distinguishing four types of silence based on the motivations underlying employees' decisions to withhold relevant information. Pinder and Harlos (2001) distinguished between acquiescent silence and quiescent silence. Acquiescent silence refers to a form of silence rooted in resignation, whereby employees accept the status quo because they see little value in attempting to influence organizational decisions. Quiescent silence, by contrast, is a self-protective form of silence motivated by fear of the personal consequences of speaking up. Van Dyne, Ang and Botero (2003) subsequently introduced the concept of prosocial silence, referring to the intentional withholding of information for the benefit of other individuals or the organization. Finally, Knoll and Van Dick (2013) identified opportunistic silence, whereby employees strategically withhold information in order to secure personal advantages.

A second approach conceptualizes silence as a collective phenomenon shaped by the strategic choices of top management and referred to as organizational silence. Rather than emerging from a series of isolated individual decisions, silence is understood as the product of organizational characteristics and managerial practices that systematically discourage employees from voicing concerns (Morrison and Milliken, 2000). This perspective shifts attention from individual motivations to the organizational context in which silence is created and sustained. In particular, it highlights the strategic role of management in fostering silence, defined as the "widely shared perceptions among employees that speaking up about problems or issues is futile and/or dangerous" (Morrison and Milliken, 2000, p. 708).

Top management influences organizational silence through both direct and indirect strategies. Directly, abusive leadership discourages dissent and increases employees' propensity to remain silent (Xu, Loi and Lam, 2015). More generally, leaders may suppress voice through behaviours that dismiss, devalue, or trivialize employees' concerns, thereby signalling that speaking up is unwelcome or unlikely to result in meaningful

action (Morrison and Milliken, 2000; Pilinkaite Sotirovic et al., 2024). Indirectly, top management can foster silence by shaping organizational structures and processes (Morrison and Milliken, 2000; Donaghey et al., 2011) to create barriers to both vertical and horizontal communication (Bird, 1996). Centralized decision-making may exclude operational employees or professionals from high-level decisions, preventing them from providing feedback and voicing concerns (Morrison and Milliken, 2000). Entwistle and Doering (2024), for instance, show how the exclusion of clinicians from high-level decision-making processes prevented them from effectively communicating upward their concerns about the declining standards of care provided by the hospital.

Silence may also be reinforced by the absence of effective mechanisms for soliciting employee feedback after decisions have been made or by the creation of formal spaces for voice in which only innocuous issues can be raised (Morrison and Milliken, 2000; Bird, 1996). Management can use employer-sponsored structures and processes to redirect or neutralize potentially disruptive feedback, thereby organizing employees out of meaningful voice (Donaghey et al., 2011).

Finally, management can sustain silence by discouraging horizontal communication and discussion among members. By isolating work units and departments, limiting interaction, and fostering competition rather than cooperation, leaders can reduce opportunities for employees to exchange information, discuss doubts, and collectively reflect on the ethical implications of organizational practices. Such arrangements fragment information across the organization and make it more difficult for individuals to recognize shared concerns or develop an understanding of potentially problematic activities, thereby reducing opportunities for collective sensemaking and dissent (Bird, 1996).

3. Creating and Sustaining Organizational Silence: The Role of top Management

3.1 Case Studies and Data

The article analyses two cases involving financial/medical fraud and alleged sexual abuse, respectively. These constitute extreme case studies (Flyvbjerg, 2006), as they concern forms of wrongdoing characterized by high moral intensity (Jones, 1991) because of the magnitude of consequences, the degree of social consensus regarding the wrongfulness of the behaviour, the probability and concentration of its effects, and its proximity and temporal immediacy. Extreme cases are particularly valuable for theory development because they activate a broader range of actors and organizational processes, thereby making underlying mechanisms more readily observable (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Specifically, in the cases examined here, the high moral intensity of the wrongdoing makes its normalization more difficult, allowing the strategic actions through which leaders sustain organizational silence and maintain wrongdoing to emerge more clearly.

The first case concerns Theranos. Founded in 2003 by Elizabeth Holmes, then a chemical engineering student at Stanford University, Theranos was a Silicon Valley startup whose name combined the terms “therapy” and “diagnosis”, reflecting the company’s aim to develop an innovative technology for the early diagnosis of disease. Its proprietary device, the miniLab, was designed to perform a wide range of blood tests using only a few drops of blood obtained through a finger prick, thereby significantly reducing the time and cost of laboratory testing (U.S. District Court, 2020). From 2009 onwards, Holmes was joined in leading the company by Ramesh “Sunny” Balwani, her partner, who held several key positions, including the presidency. Under their leadership, Theranos achieved a valuation exceeding $9 billion, employed over 500 people, and secured partnerships with major U.S. retail chains, including one of the country's largest supermarket chains and its second-largest pharmacy chain, to provide blood-testing services directly in retail locations. However, Holmes and Balwani concealed serious flaws in the company’s technology. Many tests were performed using commercially available laboratory equipment rather than Theranos' proprietary devices, while the results produced by the company’s technology were frequently unreliable. In 2022, Holmes and Balwani were convicted of defrauding investors, and Balwani was also found guilty of defrauding patients.

The second case concerns allegations of sexual abuse made by four Australian swimmers against their coach between 2001 and 2005, relating to incidents that allegedly occurred during the 1980s and between 1997 and 1999. Although the Coach was never found guilty of any criminal offence, for reasons unrelated to the substance of the allegations, the case prevented him from obtaining a Blue Card, a certification introduced by the Queensland government in 2001 to prevent individuals considered potentially unsuitable or dangerous from working with minors. Despite being refused a Blue Card, the Coach continued to work with young athletes until 2012. In particular, from 1997 he served as Head Swimming Coach at the Queensland Academy of Sport, a state-funded organization established to support élite athletes across a range of sports. Between

2010 and 2012, he also held the position of Head Coach at Swimming Queensland, the governing body for competitive swimming in the state of Queensland.

To reconstruct the organizational processes through which silence was created and sustained, the analysis draws on multiple sources. For the Theranos case, the data include court documents, online reviews posted by former employees on Indeed, Glassdoor, and Reddit, a series of documentaries, investigative journalism programs, and the book "Bad Blood: Secrets and Lies in a Silicon Valley Startup", an investigative account written by journalist John Carreyrou, who helped uncover the scandal. The swimming case draws primarily on the investigative material produced by the Australian Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, established in 2013 to investigate institutional failures in responding to child sexual abuse. Specifically, the analysis is based on the Report of Case Study No. 15, transcripts from eight public hearings conducted by the Commission involving 45 witnesses, including alleged victims and members of the organizations concerned, and the report prepared by the Counsel Assisting the Royal Commission. Together, these sources provide detailed evidence of leadership practices and organizational arrangements through which silence was created and sustained.

3.2 Theranos

The Theranos case reveals both direct and indirect strategies through which top management created and sustained silence. Directly, Theranos' leadership discouraged voice through degradation and intimidation of employees who raised issues, even when they did so in a constructive effort to address organizational problems. Employees expressing concerns were subjected to degradation ceremonies aimed at placing them in an inferior social position within the organization by reducing their status, authority, and control over specific resources (Gephart, 1978). For instance, they were labelled as "cynical" or as "naysayers" (Carreyrou, 2019, p. 187), while their competence was often called into question.

Theranos' top management further sustained silence by cultivating and exploiting employees' dependence on the organization. The company recruited numerous Indian nationals whose immigration status in the United States was contingent upon continued employment at Theranos. This condition created a pronounced power asymmetry between management and employees, making these employees particularly likely to comply with organizational demands rather than challenge questionable practices.

A third direct strategy through which top management sustained silence was the systematic dismissal of employees who raised concerns or called for change. Under Balwani's management, firings were so frequent, abrupt, and opaque that employees coined the expression "Sunny disappeared someone" (Carreyrou, 2019, p. 87) to describe the sudden removal of colleagues.

Indirectly, Theranos' leadership sought to sustain silence by restricting the flow of information—both horizontally across departments, and vertically between departments and the board of directors. The exchange of information was discouraged not only through managerial directives but also through the design of organizational processes. Work was organized into small, highly segregated groups that operated largely in isolation from one another, creating a condition of structural secrecy (Vaughan, 1999) in which the fragmentation of information made it difficult for individuals to identify organizational wrongdoing.

The fragmentation of work processes was reinforced by severe restrictions on employees' access to information. Internal messaging systems were shut down (Carreyrou, 2019), and strict limits were placed on access to documents and operational data. These restrictions were so extensive that they produced paradoxical situations. For example, the laboratory director, despite being responsible for ensuring the accuracy of test results provided to physicians and patients, was denied access to quality-control data. Taken together, these organizational arrangements constrained employees' ability to assemble a comprehensive picture of organizational activities, thereby limiting opportunities for questioning, dissent, and voice.

3.3 Australian Swimming Case

The Australian swimming case also reveals that top management used both direct and indirect strategies to create and sustain silence. In 2000, the Queensland government enacted the Commission for Children and Young People Act 2000 (CCYPA), which required employers to obtain suitability clearances for employees working with minors from the Commission for Children and Young People and Child Guardian (CCYPCG). Although government agencies were exempt from this requirement, from 2008 onward the Queensland Academy of Sport decided to require Blue Cards for all of its employees. Even though the Coach was the only one who failed to obtain certification, he remained in his position because the top management of both the

Academy and Swimming Queensland considered his expertise essential for the success of Queensland élite swimming and, accordingly, they exerted pressure on their lower managers to prioritize performance over safeguarding concerns. The Executive Director of the Academy at that time explained that he had confirmed the Coach as Head Coach despite the absence of a Blue Card because "I was advised by my superiors [the performance directors] that it was in the best interests of swimming to continue to employ him" (Royal Commission, 2014a, p. 8393).

This situation did not substantially change after February 2010, when the Coach was appointed Head Coach of Swimming Queensland even though, unlike the Academy, Swimming Queensland was not exempt from the Blue Card requirement. The organization justified this decision by arguing that the CCYPA applied only to positions primarily responsible for providing services and activities to children, whereas the Head Coach was responsible for coaching other coaches, managing the organizational aspects of international competitions, and performing administrative duties (Royal Commission, 2014a, pp. 8314, 8324, 8365, 8398). In practice, however, the Coach continued to have regular contact with young athletes, both on pool decks, in private conversations, and during international trips (Royal Commission, 2014a, pp. 8236, 8324–8326, 8356; Royal Commission, 2014b, pp. 8529–8530).

Indirectly, top management sought to sustain silence by ensuring the absence of effective internal monitoring and control structures. At the Academy, the Executive Director acknowledged that no specific measures had been adopted to mitigate the risks associated with the Coach's continued employment. Instead, the organization relied on voluntary reporting, which was "primarily informal" and not part of any routine monitoring process (Royal Commission, 2014a, pp. 8362–8365). A similar situation emerged at Swimming Queensland. The Royal Commission concluded that "there is no evidence of any formal or structured supervision of Mr Volkers", despite Swimming Queensland's attempts to characterize his position as one involving only supervised access to children (Royal Commission, 2015, p. 135; Royal Commission, 2014a, pp. 8338–8340). Taken together, these arrangements suggest that organizational leaders did not merely overlook potential risks. Rather, they structured the organizational context in ways that allowed concerns to remain unaddressed and unspoken, thereby reducing opportunities for scrutiny, challenge, and voice.

4. Discussion and Conclusion

Despite substantial differences in industry, organizational form, and the type of wrongdoing involved, the cases of Theranos and Australian high-performance swimming reveal a common organizational mechanism through which wrongdoing is sustained over time: top management actively creates and maintains organizational silence, suggesting that the persistence of wrongdoing is not merely an unintended by-product of organizational life or a wholly self-reinforcing process. Rather, the findings indicate that organizational silence constitutes a distinct, yet complementary, mechanism.

The two cases reveal that leaders sustain organizational silence through a combination of direct strategies (based on interpersonal interactions) and indirect strategies (based on the design of organizational structures and processes) (Table 1).

Table 1: Leadership's strategies for organizational silence

	Australian swimming case	**Theranos**
Direct strategy	Rationalization	Threats; degradation; retaliation
Indirect strategy	Compartmentalization of information (through weak monitoring and reporting systems)	Compartmentalization of information (through restricted access to documents, fragmented work processes, communication restrictions)

Direct strategies, in both cases, consist of leaders signalling to organizational members that questioning organizational priorities or practices carries negative consequences, although pressures took very different forms. In the Australian swimming case, this was achieved primarily through rationalizations that framed questionable practices as necessary for organizational success and encouraged lower-level managers to prioritize performance over safeguarding concerns. In Theranos, by contrast, leaders relied heavily on threats and degradation to silence employees, a finding consistent with previous research (Morrison and Milliken, 2000; Pilinkaite Sotirovic et al., 2024). At the same time, the Theranos case extends this literature by illustrating that leaders may strategically increase their leverage over employees by increasing employees' dependence and vulnerability.

A second category consists of indirect strategies that operate through the design of organizational structures and processes. Notably, in both cases, leaders' strategies were very different but shared a common goal: constraining the circulation of information within the organization. In the Australian swimming case, leaders pursued this objective through the absence of effective monitoring, reporting, and control systems. In Theranos, this objective was achieved through restrictions on communication and the isolation of work units. In both cases, the arrangements reduced opportunities for organizational members to develop a shared understanding of potentially problematic practices or even to become aware of them. Previous research has shown that organizational structures may unintentionally contribute to wrongdoing by fragmenting information, diffusing responsibility, and generating conditions of structural secrecy (Vaughan, 1999; Catino, 2013). Our findings extend this literature by suggesting that such arrangements may also be deliberately designed and maintained by leaders as mechanisms for producing organizational silence. In this respect, the function of organizational structures is not merely operational but also political, as they regulate access to information, constrain communication, and limit opportunities for scrutiny and dissent.

These findings contribute to the literature on organizational wrongdoing in three ways. First, they complement explanations based on the normalization of wrongdoing by bringing insights from the literature on organizational silence. Specifically, they show that the persistence of wrongdoing depends not only on employees coming to view wrongdoing as normal or acceptable, but also on their reluctance to voice concerns due to fear, perception of futility, and dependence on the organization. Second, the article highlights the strategic role of top management in sustaining wrongdoing. Rather than treating leaders primarily as initiators of wrongdoing, our findings show how they also actively maintain organizational conditions that suppress dissent. The persistence of wrongdoing thus depends not only on normalization, but also on leaders' continuing efforts to prevent concerns from being raised and acted upon. These efforts are crucial for explaining why wrongdoing persists despite the presence of organizational members who recognize problems and might otherwise speak up. Third, the article suggests that leaders can adopt a mix of direct and indirect strategies to create organizational silence, depending on the specific contexts. Despite this variation, both cases reveal that controlling the circulation of information is fundamental to sustaining organizational silence and, ultimately, to maintaining wrongdoing over time. Future research on organizational wrongdoing should therefore pay greater attention to understanding how leaders structure organizational contexts to suppress dissent, with particular attention to the informational dimension.

Ethical Statement: Ethical approval was not required for this study because it relied exclusively on publicly available sources, including court documents, official reports, publicly accessible media materials, and online content.

AI Statement: The author used AI to assist with copy editing.

References

Ashforth, B. and Anand, V. (2003) "The normalization of corruption in organizations", *Research in Organizational Behavior*, Vol. 25, pp. 1–52.

Bird, F.B. (1996) *The muted conscience: Moral silence and the practice of ethics in business*, Quorum Books, Westport, CT.

Carreyrou, J. (2019) *Una sola goccia di sangue. Segreti e bugie di una startup nella Silicon Valley*, Mondadori, Milano.

Catino, M. (2013) *Organizational Myopia: Problems of Rationality and Foresight in Organizations*, Cambridge University Press, New York.

Culiberg, B. and Mihelič, K.K. (2017) "The evolution of whistleblowing studies: A critical review and research agenda", *Journal of Business Ethics*, Vol. 146, No. 4, pp. 787– 803.

Donaghey, J., Cullinane, N., Dundon, T. and Wilkinson, A. (2011) "Reconceptualising employee silence: Problems and prognosis", *Work, employment and society*, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 51–67.

Efthymiopoulos, A., Goula, A. and Psychogios, A. (2024) "Organizational Silence and Organizational Commitment: Empirical Evidence from the Greek Public Sector", *Journal of Applied Social Science*, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 346–363.

Entwistle, T. and Doering, H. (2024) "Amoral Management and the Normalisation of Deviance: The Case of Stafford Hospital", *Journal of Business Ethics*, Vol. 190, No. 3, pp. 723–738.

European Commission (2025) Citizens' attitudes towards corruption in the EU in 2025, Eurobarometer Report.

Fleming, P., Zyglidopoulos, S., Boura, M. and Lioukas, S. (2022) "How Corruption is Tolerated in the Greek Public Sector: Toward a Second–Order Theory of Normalization", *Business & Society*, Vol. 61, No. 1, pp. 191– 224.

Flyvbjerg, B. (2006) "Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research", *Qualitative Inquiry*, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 219–245.

Gabbioneta, C., Clemente, M. and Greenwood, R. (Eds.) (2023) *Organizational wrongdoing as the "foundational" grand challenge: definitions and antecedents*, Emerald Publishing Limited, London.

Gephart, R.P. (1978) "Status Degradation and Organizational Succession: An Ethnomethodological Approach", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 553–581.

Greve, H., Palmer, D. and Pozner, J.E. (2010) “Organizations Gone Wild: The Causes, Processes, and Consequences of Organizational Misconduct”, *Academy of Management Annals*, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 53–107.

Jones, T.M. (1991) "Ethical Decision Making by Individuals in Organizations: An Issue-Contingent Model", *Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 366–395.

Knoll, M. and van Dick, R. (2013) “Do I Hear the Whistle…? A First Attempt to Measure Four Forms of Employee Silence and Their Correlates”, *Journal of Business Ethics*, Vol. 113, pp. 349–362.

Milliken, F.J., Morrison, E.W. and Hewlin, P.F. (2003) “An Exploratory Study of Employee Silence: Issues that Employees Don’t Communicate Upward and Why”, *Journal of Management Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 6, pp. 1453– 1476.

Mintzberg, H. (1987) "The Strategy Concept I: Five Ps for Strategy", *California Management Review*, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 11–24.

Morrison, E.W. (2023) “Employee voice and silence: Taking stock a decade later”, *Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior*, Vol. 10, pp. 79–107.

Morrison, E.W. and Milliken, F.J. (2000) “Organizational silence: a barrier to change and development in a pluralistic world”, *Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 706–731.

Ozer, M., Chen, T. and Tang, J.W. (2024) “Detrimental Effects of Remaining Silent about Operational Concerns at Work: Implications for employee outcomes”, *Organization Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 11, pp. 1611–1643.

Palmer, D. (2012) *Normal Organizational Wrongdoing: A Critical Analysis of Theories of Misconduct in and by Organizations*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Palmer, D., Smith–Crowe, K. and Greenwood, R., (Eds.) (2016) *Organizational Wrongdoing: Key Perspectives and New Directions*, Cambridge University Press, New York.

Pilinkaite Sotirovic, V., Lipinsky, A., Struzińska, K. and Ranea–Triviño, B. (2024) “You Can Knock on the Doors and Windows of the University, but Nobody Will Care: How Universities Benefit from Network Silence around Gender–Based Violence”, *Social Sciences*, Vol. 13, No. 4, 199.

Pinder, C.C. and Harlos, K.P. (2001) “Employee silence: Quiescence and acquiescence as responses to perceived injustice”, *Research in Personnel and Human Resources Management*, Vol. 20, pp. 331–369.

Rocchi, S. (2025) “Quando perseverare è diabolico: uscita, voce e lealtà come meccanismi di mantenimento dell’Organizational Wrongdoing”, *Sociologia del Lavoro*, 172/2025, pp. 225–242.

Royal Commission (2014a) *Public Hearing. Case Study 15*, day 79, Sydney, Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse.

Royal Commission (2014b) *Public Hearing. Case Study 15*, day 80, Sydney, Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse.

Royal Commission (2015) Report of case study No. 15. Response of swimming institutions, the Queensland and NSW Offices of the DPP and the Queensland Commission for Children and Young People and Child Guardian to allegations of child sexual abuse by swimming coaches.

Sherf, E.N., Parke, M.R. and Isaakyan, S. (2021) “Distinguishing Voice and Silence at Work: Unique Relationships with Perceived Impact, Psychological Safety, and Burnout”, *Academy of Management Journal*, Vol. 64, No. 1, pp. 114–148.

U.S. District Court (2020). Third Superseding Indictment UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ELIZABETH A. HOLMES and RAMESH "SUNNY" BALWANI, CR 18–0258 EJD.

Van Dyne, L., Ang, S. and Botero, I.C. (2003) “Conceptualizing employee silence and employee voice as multidimensional constructs”, *Journal of Management Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 6, pp. 1359–1392.

Vaughan, D. (1996) *The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA*, Chicago, IL, The University of Chicago Press.

Vaughan, D. (1999) “The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster”, *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 25, pp. 271–305.

Weiss, M. and Zacher, H. (2025) “Still Waters Run Deep: How Employee Silence Affects Instigated Workplace Incivility Over Time”, *Journal of Business Ethics*, Vol. 201, No. 3, pp. 587–604.

Xu, A.J., Loi, R. and Lam, L.W. (2015) “The bad boss takes it all: How abusive supervision and leader-member exchange interact to influence employee silence”, *The Leadership Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 5, pp. 763–774.