Meaning-making as a Weapon: Russia's AI-driven Cognitive Warfare and the Justification of the War in Ukraine

Niina Meriläinen
South-Eastern University of Applied Sciences, Finland

niina.j.merilainen@gmail.com

Abstract: This article examines how Russia uses meaning-making to justify its invasion of Ukraine and explores the role of AI in cognitive warfare. Drawing on framing theory and reflexive control, the study shows how coordinated narratives portray Ukraine as historically inseparable from Russia and Russia as a defensive actor. The analysis contributes a unified framework linking meaning-making, framing, and AI-enabled influence operations. The findings demonstrate the practical value of this approach for identifying coordinated cognitive warfare in the commutative ecosystem and suggest that countering AI-enabled cognitive warfare requires both technological measures and stronger societal resilience.

Keywords: Meaning-making, Cognitive warfare, Framing, Warfare, Russia, Ukraine

1. Introduction

In information warfare, the primary domain is information itself, whereas cognitive warfare targets the human mind and the meaning-making processes that shape perception. This theoretical paper focuses on the latter while acknowledging the close relationship between information warfare and cognitive warfare, particularly in the construction and dissemination of meaning during war. Following Lippmann (1922), people may live in the same world while living in different realities. In the age of AI, these realities are increasingly personalised through algorithmically curated communication that can reinforce existing biases and fears (Glickman & Sharot, 2025; Meriläinen, 2026). Meaning-making refers to the mental construction of relationships between events, actors, and ideas (Baumeister, 1991; Park, 2010), shaping how individuals and societies interpret causality beyond factual claims. Cognitive warfare can therefore be understood as a struggle over meaning organised through selective framing. Framing functions as a central mechanism through which actors define problems, assign responsibility, make moral evaluations, and legitimise action (Entman, 1993; Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011). Rather than targeting isolated facts, cognitive warfare seeks to shape the interpretive frameworks through which facts acquire meaning. AI intensifies this process by enabling the rapid production, adaptation, and dissemination of narratives across diverse audiences and platforms. Meaning-making thus becomes both the target and the instrument of influence, linking cognitive processes, strategic communication, and digital technologies into a single battlespace. AI increasingly amplifies these processes by producing, personalising, and disseminating competing interpretations of reality at scale. Against this background, this paper examines how Russia has used meaning-making to justify its invasion of Ukraine and explores the possible role of AI in these cognitive warfare processes. The research question is: How does Russia employ systematic meaning-making and AI-driven cognitive warfare to justify and legitimise its invasion of Ukraine?

2. Related Works

2.1 Framing in Meaning-making

Framing is central to meaning-making and can be deliberately weaponised in warfare to shape not only beliefs but also behaviour. Cognitive warfare targets perception, interpretation, and decision-making, making the human mind a primary domain of war (NATO, 2025; Schmidle, 2026). Through the selective emphasis of certain aspects of reality, frames define problems, assign causality, produce moral evaluations, and suggest solutions (Entman, 1993). Building on Goffman (1974), framing structures perception rather than merely transmitting information, allowing actors to construct selective versions of social and political reality (Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011; Meriläinen, 2014). Framing effects emerge when issue presentation shapes interpretation (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007; Brewer & Gross, 2005), often reinforcing existing beliefs and values (McCombs & Reynolds, 2002). Historically, legacy media and war correspondents played a key role in these processes (Cohen, 1963; McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Kellner, 2008), while repetition across media systems strengthened dominant interpretations. As certain frames become salient and widely shared, they are increasingly internalised as common sense rather than persuasion or seen as propaganda.

AI increasingly transforms framing by selecting, personalising, and amplifying value-laden communication across digital platforms. By reinforcing selective exposure and linking frames across issues through bandwagoning processes, AI helps stabilise coherent meaning-making systems while marginalising alternative interpretations (Nicholson & Chong, 2011; Meriläinen, 2014). Unlike legacy media, AI-driven systems continuously adapt content based on audience reactions, enabling rapid replication, modification, and synchronisation of selective communication across platforms. Cognitive warfare therefore operates not only by controlling individual facts but by shaping the conditions through which meaning is produced and contested. Because audiences interpret messages differently, meanings are continuously adapted and reframed, creating fragmented yet highly targeted realities. In this way, cognitive warfare exploits both cognitive strengths and vulnerabilities, making ongoing processes of interpretation a central theme of war.

2.2 AI-enabled Meaning-making in Cognitive Warfare

Cognitive warfare targets how people think rather than only what they know, positioning human cognition as a primary domain of war (NATO, 2025; Deppe & Schaal, 2024; Meriläinen, 2026). AI operates at high speed, without any geographical restrictions of humane participation in content production and interaction, creating significant ability for influence (van Diggelen et al., 2025). AI-enabled systems shape visibility, prioritisation, and meaning-making processes across digital environments. These systems influence the cognitive infrastructures through which individuals and communities interpret reality, therefore meaning-making.

Framing and metaphors are used in these processes. Metaphors function as tools of influence that can shape perception and behaviour at scale (Păstae & Lupu, 2025). They therefore play a central role in meaning-making, acting alongside of Jung's archetypes. AI intensifies the role of meaning-making in warfare. AI-driven meaning-making becomes both the object and the medium of warfare. It can be understood as a dynamic human and machine ecosystem. Audiences are not passive recipients. They act as components of the system through feedback loops and participatory engagement, such as sofa warriors and other active participants in warfare (Kalpokas, 2017; Meriläinen, 2025). They make the cognitive warfare modular and ever-changing. Algorithmic processes continuously adjust content based on user responses, both active and passive. This creates iterative and self-reinforcing ecosystem of influence. It becomes difficult to separate producers from audiences, and unclear who drives meaning-making. AI, civilians, and soldiers may operate together in these processes, forming networks and self-sustained ecosystems that participate in AI-enabled meaning-making during warfare.

AI-enabled meaning-making is cost-effective. It builds on existing communication infrastructures and social networks. It exploits parasocial relationships and basic human needs such as fear, love, hunger, loneliness, since you can listen various actors form presidents to influences and get various meaning-makings. It allows rapid adaptation without triggering traditional defence mechanisms. Warfare therefore increasingly targets perception and interpretation rather than physical kinetic destruction. This shift requires a reconceptualization of warfare. Cognitive warfare is not peripheral but integral to warfare. Cognition becomes an active domain in which meaning is continuously constructed and disputed across communication channels. AI accelerates and amplifies this process, reshaping how wars are conducted and how reality is perceived.

3. Empirical Research

The empirical data for this article consists of speeches and interviews by President Vladimir Putin and Minister Sergei Lavrov, collected from OSINT sources and translated into English. Supplementary material includes English language news articles based on original Russian language sources and English-language social media posts. The data is therefore internationally accessible, which enables an analysis of meaning-making in the context of how Russia's meaning-making is framed and circulated to foreign audiences. Russia's cognitive and information warfare is grounded in the concept of reflexive control, developed by Vladimir Lefebvre in the 1960s. Reflexive control aims to shape an adversary's decisions by manipulating the informational context in which those decisions are made. The objective is to provide structured information that leads the opponent to choose actions that favour the adversary, while perceiving these actions as autonomous (Lopes, 2025). Russia's cognitive warfare connects traditional psychological warfare with the age of AI. AI-driven disinformation ecosystems automate narrative amplification and exploit societal divisions in line with the logic of reflexive control (Lopes, 2025). Reflexive control remains embedded in contemporary Russian strategic communication and cognitive warfare practices, including operations related to Ukraine (Rindzevičiūtė, 2023).

Empirically, these dynamics are visible in official Kremlin meaning-makings on the war in Ukraine. One prominent frame presents the meaning-making that Ukraine as not a real country (Kremlin, 2021). In the same

essay published a year before the invasion, Putin argued that Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians descend from Ancient Rus. He stated that they share language, Orthodox faith, and statehood. Putin claimed that the term "Ukrainian" referred to border guards rather than a nation (Kremlin, 2021). Putin describes Russians and Ukrainians as "one people, a single whole" and presents their separation as artificial and historically contingent. The same text emphasises shared origins, language, and religion, embedding the present war in a long historical narrative (Kremlin, 2021). Similarly, in a widely cited video, Putin stated that Russians and Ukrainians are one people and that Ukraine is "ours". He referred to a rule that where a Russian soldier steps, that territory belongs to Russia (Channel 4 News, 2025). In this meaning-making, Ukraine is not presented as a sovereign state but as part of a broader historical entity, the Great Russia. Military intervention, or as Russia calls it: special military operation, is therefore reframed as restoration rather than aggression. This framed meaning-making is further reinforced by emphasising Russia's international position. TASS, being Russia's official "News Agency" (2026) reports an interview with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on 5 June 2026, in which he expressed confidence in achieving the goals of the "military operation in Ukraine" and strengthening Russia's position in the international arena. Same meaning-making is seen across TASS's website since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine.

An additional framed meaning-making presents Ukraine as a neo-Nazi or extremist "regime". In official Kremlin communication, Ukraine's leadership is repeatedly described as aligned with far-right or neo-Nazi forces, often combined with claims about Western support. Putin states that leading NATO countries support far-right nationalists and neo-Nazis in Ukraine (Kremlin, 2022). In the address of 24 February 2022, the invasion is framed as necessary to protect populations allegedly subjected to "genocide" by the "Kyiv regime". It is also framed as an effort to achieve "demilitarisation and denazification" of Ukraine. This meaning-making draws on the moral authority of the Second World War and positions Russia as a defender against fascism. In a speech in 2024 (Kremlin, 2024), following Russia's annexation of Ukrainian territories, Putin congratulates Russia and the populations of the occupied areas, framing the events as a moment of celebration and long-awaited reunification of people. He presents the people as having been liberated from oppression and portrays the already established meaning-making of Kyiv as a "neo-Nazi dictatorship", while Russia is positioned as a defender against injustice and historical separation. Through the meaning-making, Russia frames itself as a liberator and protector, resisting alleged Nazism while uniting people with their "historic Motherland" (Kremlin, 2024). By linking current events to historical memory of WW2, this framing creates emotional resonance and moral justification (Kremlin, 2022). The neo-Nazi frame is also emphasised in later communication. In 2025, as reported by TASS, Putin argued that neo-Nazi views have influence in Ukraine (TASS, 2025).

Additional key meaning-making frames the invasion of Ukraine within a broader geopolitical confrontation. The war is presented as a proxy conflict driven by NATO and Western actors. Official discourse emphasises NATO expansion as a threat to Russian security and frames Western policies as aggressive. Russia is positioned as a defensive actor, while Ukraine is presented as an instrument of Western strategy. This shifts agency and responsibility and embeds the invasion of Ukraine in a wider narrative of global power struggle (Kremlin, 2022). In an interview in 2025 (Kremlin, 2025), Putin combines these forms of meaning-making. He frames Ukraine's leadership as serving radical nationalist interests rather than the broader population and describes it as similar to neo-Nazism and driven by militarism. He also presents NATO enlargement as a direct security threat to Russia, emphasising broken Western promises and the idea that one state's security cannot come at another's expense. In the meaning-making, Ukraine's security is framed as coming at the expense of Russia's. In addition, the annexation of Crimea is framed not as annexation but as an act of protection, justified by claims of a coup and threats against local populations.

Overall, these examples show that Russia's meaning-making positions the country as a defensive and liberating actor that protects its people and security while resisting external threats and illegitimate governance of Ukraine. Meaning-makings draw on historical parallels, emphasising the role of Russia as a liberator from fascism. The supporting frames are not used separately but are synchronised through processes of bandwagoning, where multiple frames reinforce each other (Nicholson & Chong, 2011). Historical unity, neo-Nazism, and Western aggression are combined into a coherent meaning. This increases cognitive coherence and reduces ambiguity for target audiences, while at the same time creating fragmentation among external audiences by introducing competing meaning-makings.

AI and digital infrastructures amplify these meaning-makings. Russian cognitive warfare operates in a networked media environment, an ecosystem, that includes state media, social platforms, proxy actors, and algorithmic distribution channels, creating a vector-like ecosystem of war. AI enables rapid content generation,

real-time adaptation, and personalised targeting. It allows actors to identify which frames generate engagement and to adjust messages accordingly. This creates feedback loops in which audience reactions shape meaning-making. Empirical research shows that AI can produce and disseminate content at scale, saturating information environments and accelerating circulation (van Diggelen et al., 2025).

AI is used to produce this content, and pro-Russian networks distribute it (Rehan, 2025). This supports Russian war aims and seeks to delegitimise Ukraine and its Western partners, including NATO (Marigliano et al., 2024). Official Kremlin meaning-making is strengthened online in various platforms. Diverse AI-generated images, videos, and memes have circulated during the war. Early in the invasion, a deepfake video depicted President Zelensky calling on Ukrainian forces to surrender (The Telegraph, 2022). The video highlighted the weakness of Ukraine and President Zelensky. It aimed to weaken trust in political leadership and create confusion at a critical moment. The quality of deepfakes has since improved, and such content has become more prominent during the war (Kuźnicka Błaszkowska & Kostyuk, 2025). These videos spread rapidly online and often portray Ukrainian soldiers and leadership in situations of fear or surrender. Additionally, deepfakes combine visual content with hashtags and frames that portray Zelensky as a terrorist or a nazi sympathiser while presenting Putin as a hero (Gabriel, 2023; globalresearch_crg, 2025). Other content depicts the Ukrainian flag being desecrated while referring to the "defeat of the neo-Nazi regime in Kyiv" (Gabriel, 2024), directly related to Kremlin's meaning-making. Deepfake videos are also used to portray Western leaders as incapable of responding effectively to Russia (Jiroramo, 2026) feeding into the meaning-making on proxy war between the West and Russia. In addition, in 2026, Russia engaged controversial American influencers and political commentators, such as Andrew Tate and Candace Owens, to spread pro-Russian meaning-makings to international audiences thru their social media. These meaning-makings included claims that questioned the purpose of Western funding to Ukraine and the greatness of Russian state. This illustrates how influencers and political figures are used in information and cognitive warfare (Meriläinen, 2025) to force people to start believing the official Russian meaning-making of the invasion of Ukraine.

4. Discussion and Conclusions

This study examined how Russia has used meaning-making to justify the invasion of Ukraine highlighting the systematic bandwagoning of frames and usage of AI. There is strong evidence of Russia's systematic meaning-making and usage of AI in its cognitive warfare. Within Russia's cognitive warfare ecosystem, the entire communication apparatus is defined as one, with multiple and layers and actors. Communication is orchestrated: frames and subsequent meaning-making processes move from presidential speeches to legacy (or propaganda State media) and other official communications to digital arenas, where networked influencers further amplify and stabilise them in the minds of their followers. Thus, broad audiences are exposed to Russia's meaning-making. Not all meanings in the communication ecosystem necessarily reach an audience, but the aim is to dominate the information space by disseminating as much official content with the help of AI, reinforcing strategic meaning-making as possible, thereby increasing audience exposure to this constructed "truth." The underlying method is to condition and gradually subordinate audiences so that, over time, Russia's meaning-making comes to be perceived as reality in people's minds, thus highlighting reflexive control of Russia.

Russia's central meaning-making frames Ukraine as a neo-Nazi regime aligned with the West and NATO, while positioning Russia as a defensive actor safeguarding its security, historical rights, and great power status (Götz & Staun, 2022; Cottey et al., 2025). These meaning-makings are reinforced through legal, historical, and ideological arguments, including claims of self-defence from Nazis to NATO, humanitarian protection, and the rewriting of history (Gill, 2022; Allison, 2024; Schuette, 2023; Treyger et al., 2025). At the same time, Russia systematically mobilises heritage, identity, and cultural memory both kinetically and cognitively, using historical revisionism and the targeting of cultural heritage to reshape identity and legitimise territorial claims (Bilgin & Hazarhun, 2023; Giusti, 2026; Claverie & Du Cluzel, 2022; Meriläinen, 2026).

Russian cognitive warfare relies on decentralised amplification, reflexive control and psychosensory warfare. Influencers, social media users, and proxy networks normalise and disseminate meaning makings, shifting from centralised propaganda to distributed influence systems driven by emotional engagement and participatory dynamics. This makes propaganda less obvious, if you trust the source whom you have a parasocial relationship with (Meriläinen & Melro, 2026). AI and ICT are present throughout this ecosystem, enabling adaptive targeting, behavioural modelling, and continuous refinement of meaning-making. Russia actively exploits AI as a central component of its cognitive warfare, embedding strategic meaning-makings into everyday communication practices and collapsing distinctions between war and peace, persuasion and

participation. The entire ecosystem of cognitive warfare combines hashtags, humour, text, memes, pictures, deepfakes, distorted layers realities to songs to further elaborate the meaning-making. Furthermore, these dynamic produces “sofa warriors” (Kalpokas, 2017; Meriläinen, 2026) whose everyday online engagement unintentionally contributes to the spread and normalisation of strategic meaning-making. Additionally, AI is used to generate data that feeds back into cognitive warfare. These developments highlight that the core struggle is not over facts alone but over meaning itself, where framing, historical narratives, emotional triggers, and AI-driven amplification interact to shape perceptions of reality (Schmidle, 2026; Paziuk et al., 2025). Ultimately, AI-driven cognitive warfare represents a strategic shift in which meaning-making becomes both the object and instrument of war. This requires societies to develop not only technological responses, but also cognitive resilience grounded in reflexivity, media literacy, and institutional trust.

War is increasingly defined by strategic struggles over meaning, where AI and digital infrastructures reshape how information is produced, circulated, and interpreted. Cognitive warfare operates by targeting the processes through which meaning emerges at individual and societal levels, shifting the focus from controlling information to controlling its interpretation (Schmidle, 2026; Nair, 2025). AI expands this battlefield by increasing the cost-effectives, speed and adaptability of influence, enabling real-time framing of meaning, automated content production, and algorithmic amplification across platforms. When false meaning-making does not resonate, AI is used to frame another one and disseminate it with the help of influencers online. What is particularly striking is the degree to which rationality is engineered. From year after year, Russia sticks to its primary meanings and repeats them from officials to digital arenas. This shows a clear planning and systematic knowledge of how strategic communication works. Through the systematic bandwagoning of frames, Russia constructs a closed interpretive system in which historical narratives, security claims, and moral justifications reinforce each other. This reduces cognitive dissonance for target audiences while limiting the space for alternative interpretations.

The findings demonstrate how Russia’s cognitive warfare is grounded in the concept of reflexive control. Meaning-makings are designed to shape how audiences interpret reality and make decisions. Based on empirical data, meaning-making is constructed through internationally accessible communication, an ecosystem. Several central meaning-makings emerge: Ukraine is portrayed as an artificial or historically inseparable entity, its leadership is framed as neo-Nazi, and the war is positioned as part of a broader geopolitical confrontation with NATO and the West, as well as Russia is liberating the people and the country, thus the moral actor. These meanings are synchronised and mutually reinforcing, creating a coherent reality that reduces ambiguity for target audiences while introducing competing interpretations internationally. Simultaneously, AI and digital infrastructures amplify these meanings by enabling large-scale, adaptive, and rapid dissemination across a networked ecosystem of state actors, media, influencers, and automated systems. Practices such as deepfakes, memes, hashtags, the production and influencer engagement further illustrate how AI-supported content is used to destabilise trust, evoke emotional responses, and legitimise strategic objectives.

What is ultimately at stake in cognitive warfare is not information itself but the power to shape the conditions under which meaning becomes possible. Building on this premise, this study advances a theoretical contribution by conceptualising meaning-making as both the target and the instrument of warfare, thereby integrating framing, propaganda, disinformation, reflexive control, and AI-enabled influence operations into a single analytical framework. While previous research has often examined these phenomena separately, the findings demonstrate that their effectiveness emerges from their convergence in coordinated meaning-making ecosystem and communicate processes that structure how reality is interpreted, evaluated, and experienced. The empirical case of Russia’s justification of the war in Ukraine illustrates the practical value of this framework. The analysis shows how synchronised frames produce coherent interpretive systems that remain persuasive even when confronted with contradictory evidence, thereby revealing how strategic narratives generate cognitive coherence and legitimacy for target audiences. The findings further suggest that cognitive warfare should not be understood as an entirely new form of war but rather as the evolution of long-standing influence practices under conditions of algorithmic mediation, where AI enables unprecedented speed, scale, adaptation, and personalisation. In this environment, reflexive control operates through continuous feedback loops that blur the boundaries between persuasion, participation, and manipulation, making audiences not only targets of influence but also active contributors to the circulation and stabilisation of meaning. At the same time, the study identifies limitations in the meaning-making framework. Although it provides a powerful tool for explaining how narratives are constructed, coordinated, and disseminated, it is less capable of measuring their direct behavioural impact. Future research should therefore combine meaning-making

analysis with audience studies, experimental methods, and behavioural data to evaluate more systematically how cognitive warfare influences attitudes and actions.

The study also offers practical implications and potential responses to the challenges identified. Because AI-enabled cognitive warfare increasingly targets interpretation rather than information alone, effective countermeasures cannot rely solely on technological solutions. Strengthening societal resilience requires the development of real-time resilience, critical thinking, institutional transparency, and public awareness of strategic framing practices from policymakers, officials, to everyday people and the military. Governments, organisations, and digital platforms should invest in AI-assisted detection of coordinated influence campaigns while increasing transparency regarding algorithmic amplification and synthetic content. To conclude, Russia's meaning-making positions the country as a defensive and liberating actor, drawing on historical memory and identity, while leveraging AI-driven cognitive warfare to shape global information environments and influence how reality is understood. These narratives are not neutral interpretations, but strategically constructed misinformation designed to legitimise the invasion and deny Ukrainian sovereignty. The broader implication extends beyond Ukraine: if actors can successfully weaponize meaning alongside kinetic military force, the future of warfare will be decided not only on the battlefield but in the struggle to define reality itself.

5. Acknowledgements

I thank the reviewer of this paper.

Ethics Declaration: No ethical clearance was required.

AI Declaration: No AI tools were used in the creation of this paper.

References

Allison, R. (2024) "Russia's Case for War against Ukraine: Legal Claims, Political Rhetoric, and Instrumentality in a Fracturing International Order", Problems of Post-Communism, Vol 71, No.3, pp 271–282.

Baumeister, R. F. (1991) Meanings of Life, New York: Guilford Press.

Bazavluk, S. V., & Kovalev, A. A. (2025) "Information warfare in a multipolar world", Vestnik RUDN, International Relations, Vol 25, No. 2, pp 236-250.

Backes, O. & Swab, A. (2019) "Cognitive Warfare. The Russian Threat to Election Integrity in the Baltic States", Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, pp 1-50.

Bilgin, Y. K., & Hazarhun, E. (2023) "The cultural heritage impact of the Russia-Ukrainian war", Turizm Akademik Dergisi, Vol 10, No. 2, pp 307-321.

Brewer, P. R. & Gross, K. (2005) "Values, framing, and citizens' thoughts about policy issues: Effects on content and quantity", Political Psychology, Vol 26, No. 6, pp 929-948

Channel4News. (2025) Putin: Putin: The whole of Ukraine is ours, Online, https://www.youtube.com/shorts/IzmElwce6bo

Claverie, B., & Du Cluzel, F. (2022) "Cognitive warfare": The advent of the concept of "cognitics" in the field of warfare, Cognitive Warfare: the future of cognitive dominance, pp 1-11.

Cohen, B. C. (1963) The Press and Foreign Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Conden, D. D. (2026) "What Bombs Cannot Occupy: Memory, Heritage, and War in Ukraine", The Penguin Review, Vol 1, No. 1.

Cottey, A., Cladi, L., & Ewers-Peters, N. (2025) "Introduction: the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and the re-making of the European security order", Defence Studies, Vol 25, No. 4, pp 759–778.

Deppe, C and Schaal, G. S. (2024) "Cognitive warfare: a conceptual analysis of the NATO ACT cognitive warfare exploratory concept", Frontiers in Big Data, Vol 7, pp 1-13.

Entman, R. (1993) "Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm", Journal of Communication, Vol 43, pp 51–58.

Gabriel. (2023) https://x.com/GabeZZOZZ/status/1741209911009091922/photo/1

Gabriel. (2024) https://x.com/GabeZZOZZ/status/1754210510461980828/video/1

Gill, T.D. (2022) "The Jus ad Bellum and Russia's "Special Military Operation" in Ukraine", Journal of International Peacekeeping, Vol 25, No. 2, pp 121–129.

Giusti, S. (2026) "The 'warization'of cultural heritage: the case of Ukraine", International Journal of Cultural Policy, pp 1-22.

Glickman, M., & Sharot, T. (2025) "How human–AI feedback loops alter human perceptual, emotional and social judgements" Nature Human Behaviour, Vol 9, No. 2, pp 345-359.

globalresearch_crg (2025) https://www.instagram.com/p/DEeU5MkTCJ8/?igsh=Nmdma2liaWN2dXQw

Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience. Harvard university press.

Götz, E., & Staun, J. (2022) "Why Russia attacked Ukraine: Strategic culture and radicalised narratives", Contemporary Security Policy, Vol 43, No. 3, pp 482–497.

Gray, G. P. (2025) "The Political Expediency of Counter-Disinformation: An Analysis of the Response to Russian Information Warfare", Online. https://tsuda.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/2000108/files/%E5%9B%BD%E9%9A%9B%E9%96%A2%E4%BF%82%E5%AD%A6%E7%A0%94%E7%A9%B651_01-16_Gray.pdf

Jiroramo, 2026) https://x.com/tartariajapan/status/2050378489229091014
Kalpokas, I. (2017) "Information warfare on social media: A brand management perspective", Baltic Journal of Law & Politics, Vol 10, No. 1, pp 35-62.
Kellner, D. (2008). "War correspondents, the military, and propaganda: Some critical reflections. International Journal of Communication, Vol. 2, 34-34.
Kremlin (2024) Address on Day of Reunification of the Donetsk People's Republic, Lugansk People's Republic and the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions with Russia. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75204
Kremlin (2022) Address by the President of the Russian Federation http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843
Kremlin (2021) Article by Vladimir Putin "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181
Kuźnicka-Błaszkowska, D., & Kostyuk, N. (2025) "Emerging need to regulate deepfakes in international law: the Russo–Ukrainian war as an example", Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol 11, No. 1.
Lippmann, W. (1922) Public Opinion, New York, USA. Macmillan.
Lopes, Joan (2025) "The Russian Reflective Control: Theory and Military Applications", Communications, Vol 12, No. 1, pp 11-23.
McCombs, M., & Reynolds, A. (2002) News influence on our pictures of the world. In Media effects. Routledge.
Marigliano, R., Ng, L. H. X., & Carley, K. M. (2024) "Analyzing digital propaganda and conflict rhetoric: a study on Russia's bot-driven campaigns and counter-narratives during the Ukraine crisis", Social Network Analysis and Mining, Vol 14, No. 1.
McCombs, M. & Shaw, D. (1972) "The agenda-setting function of mass media", Public Opinion Quarterly Vol 36, No. 2, pp 176-87
Meriläinen, N., & Melro, A. (2026) "Truth and Trust in the News: How Young People in Portugal and Finland Perceive Information Operations in the Media", Journalism and Media, Vol 7, No. 1, pp 1-19.
Meriläinen, N. (2026) "Weaponizing Heritage in Online Cognitive Warfare", Journal of Information Warfare, Vol, 25, No 2, pp. 65-77.
Meriläinen, N. (2025) "Influencers as Tools in Hybrid Operations Online", Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp 256-272.
Meriläinen, N. (2014) "Understanding the Framing of Issues in Multi-Actor Arenas Power Relations in the Human Rights Debate", Dissertation. University of Jyväskylä.
Nair, V. (2025) "Information Warfare - A Conceptual Analysis", International Journal of Current Science, Vol 15, No.4. pp 514-521.
NATO. (2025) NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO). Cognitive Warfare: NATO Chief Scientist Research Report. Available at: https://www.nato.int/content/dam/nato/webready/documents/sto/chief-scientist-report-cognitive-warfare.pdf
Nicholson, S. & Chong, D. (2011) "Jumping on the Human Rights Bandwagon: How rights-based linkages can refocus climate politics", Global Environmental Politics, Vol 11, No. 3, pp 121-136.
Paziuk, A., Lande, D., Shnurko-Tabakova, E., & Kingston, P. (2025) "Decoding manipulative narratives in cognitive warfare: a case study of the Russia-Ukraine conflict", Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence, Vol 8.
Park, C. L. (2010) "Making sense of the meaning literature: an integrative review of meaning making and its effects on adjustment to stressful life events", Psychological bulletin, Vol 136, No.2.
Păstae, V., & Lupu, D-A. (2025) "Cognitive warfare and metaphors: framing conflict in the mind", Strategic Impact, Vol 95, No. 2, pp 35-50.
Project Constitution (2026) Online https://x.com/ProjectConstitu/status/2062519715562389836
Rehan, T. (2025) AI-Driven Disinformation Campaigns on Twitter (X) in the Russia-Ukraine War. Available https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/10/02/ai-driven-disinformation/
Rindzevičiūtė, E. (2023) The will to predict: Orchestrating the future through science. Cornell University Press.
Schmidle, R. (2026) "Understanding Cognitive Warfare", PRISM, Vol 11, No. 22, pp 46-63.
Schuette, C. (2023) "Russian Disinformation on NATO Expansion and the War in Ukraine", Journal of Strategic Security, Vol 16, No. 4, pp 34–56.
Scheufele, D.A. & Tewksbury, D. (2007) "Framing, agenda setting, and priming: the evolution of three media effects models", Journal of Communication, Vol 57, No. 1, pp 9-20.
Sikorski, J. (2024) "Proxy Sources in Cognitive Warfare: The Hidden Architecture of Russian Influence Operations in Central Europe", STUDIA ADMINISTRACJI I BEZPIECZEŃSTWA, Vol 19, pp 221–238.
TASS (2026) Achieving special military operation goals to strengthen Russia's position — Lavrov, Online, https://tass.com/politics/2142153
TASS (2025) Neo-Nazi views have great influence in Ukraine, Putin says. Online, https://tass.com/politics/1935477
The Telegraph. (2022) Online, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X17yrEV5sl4
Treyger, E., Williams, H., Matthews, L. (2025) Hate and Dehumanization in Russia's Narrative on Ukraine. RAND Corporation.
van Diggelen, J., Aidman, E., Rowa, J., and Vince, J. (2025) "Designing AI-Enabled Countermeasures to Cognitive Warfare". arXiv preprint arXiv:2504.11486.
Vliegenthart, R., & Van Zoonen, L. (2011) "Power to the frame: Bringing sociology back to frame analysis", European journal of communication, Vol 26, No. 2, pp 101-115.