Cyber–Space Governance: Securing Orbit through Resilient Global Traffic Management

Abstract

This paper analyses the effectiveness of the international legal framework in mitigating the combined risks of orbital collision and cyber interference, and assesses how a global Space Traffic Management (STM) regime could enhance stability and security in outer space. Using Yin’s single-case study design, the global space governance regime is examined through Bowen’s qualitative document analysis of treaties, policies, and twelve scholarly studies, interpreted via Dunn’s public-policy analysis framework. The findings show that existing instruments establish broad norms of responsibility and liability but lack operational authority, cyber-resilient procedures, and enforceable “rules of the road.” Fragmented institutions and divergent national strategies perpetuate legal ambiguity and impede coordinated manoeuvre decisions. Cyber dependencies in orbital systems further magnify risks of misinterpretation and escalation. The study argues that an integrated STM regime—combining binding collision-avoidance authority, mandatory cyber-security standards, and interoperable data architectures—would materially reduce uncertainty and strengthen collective security. Policy recommendations include establishing a supranational coordination centre, codifying minimum separation and priority rules, and linking participation to verifiable cyber compliance. The proposed framework operationalises due regard through authority, assurance, and accountability, transforming space governance from permissive norms to enforceable safety mechanisms. By fusing legal, institutional, and technological dimensions, the research provides a practical pathway toward a secure and predictable orbital environment.