Strategic Impacts of the Cyber Offense/Defense Balance

Abstract

This paper examines how the distribution of offensive and defensive cyber operations (OCO & DCO) contributes to the achievement of strategic goals.  Drawing on established theories of the relationship of offensive and defensive weaponry in terrestrial conflict domains, the examination develops a methodological framework to assess the relative contributions of OCO and DCO to offensive and defensive cyber strategies and overall multi-domain outcomes.  The paper identifies both challenges and opportunities in associating offensive and defensive cyber capabilities with appropriate offensive and defensive strategies.  Some challenges are intrinsic to the dynamic effects of specific weapons technologies on conflict outcomes, while other challenges flow from the conditions of the cyber domain.  The paper identifies principal complicating factors in associating OCO and DCO selections with strategic outcomes, including the dual-use and indistinguishable nature of some of the most sophisticated cyber weapons; the opacity of operations incumbent to the cyber domain; complexities and data acquisition impediments in calculating precise relative costs associated with developing and utilizing offensive and defensive cyber capabilities; information paucity exacerbation of motivated analytical biases; and the sometimes inverted relationship of OCO and DCO to offensive and defensive strategies, respectively.  These findings support the importance of developing a precise and empirical evaluation methodology associating objectives achievement in the distribution and balance of OCO and DCO missions to the underlying operational and strategic objectives of those missions.