Cyber Threats to Nuclear Safety: Game Theory Strategies for Enhanced Deterrence

Abstract

The convergence of digital technology and cybersecurity introduces unprecedented risks to national security, particularly as cyber attacks increasingly target nuclear command, control, and communication systems (NC3). These threats escalate the stakes beyond traditional warfare, challenging established deterrence frameworks and creating a complex interplay between cyber and nuclear domains. This paper leverages advanced economic game theory, employing a non-cooperative model and dynamic analysis to dissect the strategic decision-making processes of rational actors in this volatile environment. By focusing on critical aspects like signaling, escalation management, and attribution uncertainty, we illuminate the intricate dynamics that arise when cyber intrusions threaten nuclear stability. Through the concept of a "cyber-nuclear deterrence equilibrium," we redefine the strategic balance states must achieve, factoring in the asymmetric nature of cyber capabilities and the profound uncertainty in attributing cyber attacks. Our dynamic game-theoretic approach explores potential scenarios where cyber disruptions could weaken nuclear deterrence, compromise command and control structures, or lead to unintended escalations. By incorporating real-world variables—such as detection capabilities, the credibility of retaliation, and the asymmetry of cyber power between adversaries—we build a comprehensive framework to address the new calculus of deterrence shaped by cyber threats. The findings underscore the urgent need for integrated cyber and nuclear security policies, as traditional deterrence strategies are insufficient in the face of this dual-threat landscape. We propose tailored, game-theoretic strategies to enhance signaling clarity, increase system resilience, and reduce the risks of miscalculation during cyber incidents affecting nuclear infrastructure. Ultimately, this research offers policymakers a strategic toolkit grounded in game theory, designed to craft adaptive, forward-thinking deterrence measures that align with the evolving realities of cyber-nuclear interdependence. Our analysis attempts not only to contribute to the academic discourse on deterrence theory but also to provide actionable guidance for strengthening global security in an era where the boundaries between cyber and nuclear threats are increasingly blurred.