Supporting Amphibious Forces with Partnered U.S: Japan Cyber Operations

Abstract

The first island chain is a threat environment characterized by persistent and sophisticated cyber activities by state
and non-state actors, as well as strategic competition with China, North Korea, and Russia. To operate in these conditions
the United States Marine Corps has proposed the Stand-in Force, a small, low-signature force establishing the forward edge
of a partnered defense-in-depth in the United States Indo-Pacific Command area of operations. This paper examines the
efficacy of utilizing partnered and allied cyber infrastructure to support persistent reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance
operations by Stand-In Forces within contested maritime zones. It focuses on Japan, a key ally in the Western
Pacific. Through a case study approach, it examines the nation’s cyber command structure, defense network security, existing
cyber agreements with the United States, and barriers to cooperation, congruently assessing their cyber capabilities and
willingness to cooperate in cyberspace. The result is a summary of their ability to support the Stand-In Forces in defensive
and offensive cyber operations, an analysis of current barriers, and the requirements of an ideally cyber-capable Stand-In
Force.