Towards a Resilience Framework for Securing ADS-B Surveillance Systems in Air Traffic Management

Abstract

Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B) has become a cornerstone of modern air traffic surveillance, enabling real-time aircraft tracking and supporting enhanced situational awareness within Air Traffic Management (ATM) systems. However, the open and unauthenticated nature of ADS-B transmissions introduces significant cybersecurity vulnerabilities, including spoofing, jamming, and data injection attacks. These threats pose risks not only to surveillance integrity but also to operational trust and decision-making in safety-critical environments. This paper presents a resilience-based cybersecurity framework for securing ADS-B systems within ATM environments, with particular consideration of resource-constrained and evolving airspace environments. The proposed framework integrates technical detection mechanisms, operational response strategies, and governance principles to enhance system robustness against cyber-physical threats. A scenario-based approach is adopted to illustrate how the framework supports the detection and management of anomalous ADS-B behaviour, while maintaining continuity of surveillance services. The contribution of this work lies in bridging the gap between theoretical vulnerability analysis and practical resilience design in aviation surveillance systems. The framework provides a structured foundation for enhancing cybersecurity posture in ADS-B-enabled environments and supports ongoing research into resilient and trustworthy air traffic systems.