Information Campaigns in Irregular Warfare: A Framework for Expanding the Threshold of Competition
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.34190/eccws.25.1.4824Keywords:
Information Campaigns, Irregular Warfare, Gray Zone Competition, Decision Advantage, Psychological Operations, Narrative StrategyAbstract
Contemporary irregular warfare increasingly unfolds through coordinated information campaigns designed to shape adversary perception, fragment decision-making, and expand competitive space below traditional escalation thresholds. While deterrence frameworks have historically emphasized military capability and economic leverage, modern competitors employ narrative operations, psychological pressure, and legitimacy contests to achieve strategic effects without decisive kinetic engagement. Classic coercion theory emphasizes that influence over adversary decision conditions often matters more than direct force application, particularly in ambiguous competitive environments (Schelling, 1966; Freedman, 2013). This paper proposes a decision-centric framework for information campaigns in irregular warfare that explains how coordinated narrative, psychological, and cyber-enabled information actions expand the threshold of competition. The framework integrates deterrence theory, irregular warfare doctrine, and gray zone competition research to show how information campaigns generate cumulative strategic effects through tempo disruption, legitimacy shaping, and perception control. Case evidence from Hizballah’s psychological campaign, Chinese gray zone coercion, and contemporary Russian information operations illustrates how sustained campaigns produce denial, cost imposition, and delegitimization effects without triggering conventional escalation (Wehrey, 2002; Lin et al., 2022; Kalenský and Osadchuk, 2024). The contribution of this study is a structured campaign framework that links information actions to decision advantage and operational outcomes. This model supports parallel, multidomain action and helps practitioners design campaigns that shape competitive conditions before escalation thresholds are crossed.
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